pypi / nltk
nltk
What changed in nltk 3, from its official release notes, upgrade guides and advisories. Sources checked 2026-10-18.
33 security
See which of these apply to your code, ranked, in your agent:
npx @unstale/cli initnltk 333 changes
Security 33
NLTK: Allowlisted pickle loaders still permit code execution in current source
NLTK AllowlistUnpickler dotted-name validation bypass allows remote code execution
NLTK: Corpus Reader Sandbox Bypass
NLTK: Corpus readers follow symlinks outside trusted roots despite pathsec enforcement
NLTK CrubadanCorpusReader path traversal allows arbitrary file disclosure
NLTK: Downloader.download follows hardlinks and overwrites outside-root files
NLTK: Entity-expansion DoS (billion laughs) via remaining raw ElementTree parses
NLTK: JVM argument injection bypass via per-call options in the NLTK Stanford wrappers (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-12841)
NLTK: pathsec SSRF protection can be bypassed when a proxy is configured
NLTK: Pl196xCorpusReader has quadratic ReDoS on malformed TEI blocks
NLTK: Quadratic CPU Exhaustion in
XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment()NLTK: Quadratic-time DoS in PorterStemmer via long runs of 'y'
NLTK: ReDoS in nltk.tgrep via unvalidated user-supplied regular expressions
NLTK: Uncontrolled recursion in nltk.featstruct.FeatStructReader causes unhandled RecursionError (DoS) via deeply nested feature-structure input
NLTK: Uncontrolled resource consumption in RecursiveDescentParser via ambiguous or left-recursive grammars
NLTK: Uncontrolled search path when invoking the Graphviz 'dot' binary
NLTK: Symlink-based arbitrary file read in IPIPANCorpusReader, bypasses nltk.pathsec entirely
NLTK: Symlink-based sandbox bypass in FramenetCorpusReader (bypasses the fix for CVE-2026-54292)
Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK): DNS-rebinding SSRF filter bypass in nltk.pathsec.urlopen (nltk.download / nltk.data.load) defeats ENFORCE mode
Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) has path traversal in FramenetCorpusReader.frame() that allows arbitrary XML file read, bypassing the nltk.pathsec sandbox (ENFORCE=True)
Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK): Path Traversal in NKJPCorpusReader leads to Arbitrary File Read and bypasses the nltk.pathsec sandbox (ENFORCE=True)
Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK): ReDoS in NLTK ReviewsCorpusReader FEATURES regex
Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK): URL-Encoded Path Traversal in nltk.data.load() Allows Arbitrary Local File Read
nltk: Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in nltk.data.load() through Percent-Encoded Sequences
NLTK: Default ENFORCE=False Disables All pathsec Security Controls
NLTK downloader allows cross-package resource and model poisoning
NLTK: FileSystemPathPointer.open() sandbox check is dead code — arbitrary file read via file:// protocol
NLTK network URL validation permits SSRF to RFC 6598 shared-address-space hosts
NLTK: ReDoS in nltk.text.Text.findall() via unvalidated user-supplied regular expressions
NLTK: SSRF Fail-Open in validate_network_url() via DNS Resolution Failure
NLTK: Stable FrameNet and NKJP readers parse outside-root XML
NLTK: StreamBackedCorpusView Bypasses pathsec.ENFORCE - Arbitrary Local File Read
NLTK: Unsafe Pickle Deserialization in TransitionParser Allows Remote Code Execution